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NOTE
Trapped: Missouri Legislature Seeks to
Close Workers' Compensation Loophole
with Some Co-Employees Still Inside
Robinson v. Hooker, 323 S.W.3d 418 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010), transfer denied,
No. SC91216, 2010 Mo. LEXIS 291 (2010) (Mo. Nov. 16, 2010).
ALEXANDER CORNWELL*
"Currently, all Missouri workers are at risk of being sued and held liable for
honest accidents at work and that is simply unfair ....
1. INTRODUCTION
Century-old judicial precedent in Missouri clearly establishes that an in-
jured worker may not bring a personal injury action against his or her co-
employee for negligently failing to provide a safe workplace.2 Providing a
safe working environment is a non-delegable duty of the employer, so when
an employee performs in the employer's stead, the law treats the employee as
stepping in the shoes of the employer.3
When Missouri passed its workers' compensation statute in 1926, em-
ployers were granted immunity from civil actions their employees brought in
exchange for providing guaranteed compensation to injured employees, irre-
4
spective of negligence. The legislature read the common law treatment of an
employer's non-delegable duty into the Act, and co-employees remained
immune from civil actions insofar as a compensable injury occurred as a re-
* B.S., Fontbonne University, 2007; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri
School of Law, 2012; Lead Articles Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2011-12. 1 am
grateful to Dean Rafael Gely for his guidance during my writing process and to the
editorial board and members of the Missouri Law Review.
1. Senate Votes to Protect Employees, Mo. ST. SEN. ROBERT N. MAYER,
http://www.senate.mo.gov/mediall I info/mayer/releases/031711 -EmployeeProtect
ionApproved.html (last visited Dec. 31, 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(statement of Missouri Senate Assistant Majority Floor Leader Jack Goodman refer-
encing the fallout of the Robinson v. Hooker decision).
2. See Carson v. Quinn, 105 S.W. 1088, 1090-91 (Mo. App. 1907).
3. Bender v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 276 S.W. 405, 406 (Mo. 1925).
4. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.120.1 (2000).
1
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sult of their negligent performance of the employer's duty.5 However, in
Missouri, this is the only instance where a co-employee is granted immunity
from civil suit.6 Thus, if a worker is injured by a co-employee's action that
constitutes "somethin more" than a mere failure to provide a safe workplace,
a civil action will lie. In this respect, Missouri is in the distinct minority of
jurisdictions that allow injured workers to bring personal negligence actions
against co-employees.8
It is necessary to hold co-employees immune for a failure to correctly
carry out the employer's duty to provide a safe work environment because
employers, under many circumstances, remain obligated to indemnify their
employees for judgments rendered against them.9 If an employee can be sued
for negligently failing to perform the employer's duty and the employer then
has to pay damages for injuries resulting from a breach of that duty, the em-
ployer would in effect be paying civil damages for its own breach.' 0 Since
workers' compensation is intended to grant employers immunity under those
exact circumstances, allowing such claims is in direct contravention of the
whole Act."
As a result of the Western District Court of Appeals' decision in Robin-
son v. Hooker, co-employee liability in Missouri has changed from being
somewhat permissive to utterly submissive.12 The court, for the first time,
focused entirely on the definition of "employer" in the workers' compensa-
tion statute and found that employees are not included.13 By doing so, the
court destroyed co-employee immunity in every context, and employees are
now amenable to civil suit even if the breach was that of an employer's non-
delegable duty.14 As a result, Missouri is currently the only state in the entire
nation to allow a civil action against a co-employee who negligently performs
5. State ex rel. Badami v. Gaertner, 630 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Mo. App. E.D. 1982)
(en banc), superseded by statute, S.B. 1, 93rd Gen. Assemb., Ist Reg. Sess. (Mo.
2005), as stated in Robinson v. Hooker, 323 S.W.3d 418 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010).
6. In the context of a failure to provide a safe workplace, it should be noted that
"co-employee immunity" is somewhat of a misnomer. As indicated, a co-employee is
granted immunity by virtue of that employee acting in place of his employer. Id. at
177. The law treats the employee as stepping in the shoes of the employer. See id
Thus, it is actually the employer's immunity that is extended to an employee by virtue
of that legal distinction. See id.
7. See id. at 180.
8. See infra Part III.D.




12. See 323 S.W.3d 418, 422, 424-25 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010), transfer denied,
No. SC91216, 2010 Mo. LEXIS 291 (2010) (Mo. Nov. 16, 2010).
13. See id. at 423-25.
14. See id. at 425.
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the employer's duty to provide a safe workplace. 5 The court's seismic doc-
trinal shift is matched only by its immense practical consequences.
This Note is a primer for Missouri practitioners to better understand the
practical effect Robinson has had on co-employee liability in Missouri. Part
II provides the unassuming factual background giving rise to Robinson's sub-
stantial departure from previous case law. To understand the context in
which the court decided Robinson, Part III outlines Missouri's historical ap-
proach to co-employee liability and the recent statutory amendments mandat-
ing strict construction of the workers' compensation act that prompted the
court's holding. In response, Part IV considers whether that extensive depar-
ture was warranted. After illustrating that the holding is not congruent with
legislative intent and historical context, this Note will examine the pragmatic
effect of Robinson. Lastly, this Note will analyze whether Robinson - mon-
umental in its own right - is indicative of a larger problem with workers'
compensation in Missouri ushered in by the 2005 amendments requiring strict
interpretation of the Act.
1I. FACTS AND HOLDING
In October 2007, two co-workers, Richard Robinson and Cheryl Hook-
er, were performing their duties as street cleaners in Kansas City, Missouri,
when Hooker lost her grip on a high pressure hose used to perform her work-
related tasks.16 The hose swung wildly, struck Robinson in his eye, and
caused permanent blindness. 17 In response to the eye injury, Robinson filed a
workers' compensation claim against his employer, the City of Kansas City.18
On January 30, 2009, a settlement was reached and approved by a judge with-
in the Division of Workers' Compensation.' 9
After Robinson received an award for his injuries by way of workers'
compensation benefits, he brought a civil claim against his co-worker, Hook-
er, in Jackson County Circuit Court.20 In his petition, Robinson alleged that
his eye injury was the result of Hooker's negligent operation of the high pres-
sure hose.21 Hooker filed a motion to dismiss Robinson's petition, declaring
that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the action.22 Specifi-
cally, Hooker claimed the court lacked jurisdiction because Hooker shared
15. See infra Part Ill.D.
16. Robinson, 323 S.W.3d at 421.
17. Id.
18. Appellant Richard Robinson's Brief at 1, Robinson, 323 S.W.3d 418 (No.
WD71207), 2009 WL 3751947, at *1.
19. Id. at 1-2.
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immunity with her employer under workers' compensation law.23 In addi-
tion, she claimed that res judicata and estoppel barred Robinson's cause of
action because the prior settlement award he received from the Department of
Labor and Industrial Relations arose out of the same alleged incident and
24injury. Further, Hooker relied on the doctrine of official immunity and stat-
ed that she could not be liable because the injury occurred while she was a
public official performing a discretionary act.25 The trial court agreed with
Hooker and granted her motion to dismiss without explanation.26 Thereafter,
27Robinson appealed the dismissal of his petition.
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District found that the
circuit court erred in granting the defendant's motion to dismiss.28 With re-
spect to defendant Hooker's claim that the Workers' Compensation Act bars
civil claims against co-employees, the court held that the judicial extension of
co-employee liability was no longer appropriate after a 2005 amendment to
the Act requiring courts to use strict construction in applying the provisions
of the workers' compensation statute.29 The court held immunity only applies
to employers under the Act, and co-employees, strictly interpreted, do not fall
within the statutory definition of an employer. 30 The court held that the
workers' compensation statute does not preclude an injured employee from
bringing an action in tort against a co-employee, and therefore, Robinson's
claim was not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Division of Workers'
Compensation.3 1
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Co-Employee Liability Pre-Dating Workers' Compensation
Prior to the passage of Missouri's Workers' Compensation Act in 1926,
employees who sustained an injury at work were severely limited in their
ability to recover from their employer. 32 An injured employee could bring a
common law negligence action against his employer; however, employers
were minimally obligated to exercise reasonable care.33  Employees were
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 426.
26. Id. at 421.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 427.
29. Id. at 423-25.
30. Id. at 424.
31. See id. at 425.
32. See generally Gunnett v. Girardier Bldg. & Realty Co., 70 S.W.3d 632 (Mo.
App. E.D. 2002).
33. 1 ARTHUR LARSON & LEx K. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION
LAW § 2.03 (2011).
238 [Vol. 77
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further limited from obtaining redress by the "unholy trinity" of common law
defenses. 34 One such defense included the fellow-servant exception.35 Under
this common law defense, employers were absolved from liability to employ-
ees "for injuries incurred or suffered solely as the result of the negligence,
carelessness, or misconduct of others who are in the service of the employer
and who are engaged in the same common or general employment as the in-
jured employee." 36 It represented an exception to the well-established rule of
respondeat superior, whereby employers are liable for negligent acts or omis-
sions of their employees if committed within the scope of their employment.
The converse of the employer's ability to avoid liability is that an injured
38
employee could bring an action against a co-employee.
Since employers were practically insulated from any adverse judgments
for workplace injuries,3 Missouri courts began decreasing the level of em-
ployer protection. Courts utilized the dual-capacity doctrine to find that an
employee could serve concurrently as both a servant (employee) and a vice-
principal of the master (employer).40 The doctrine provided that the employer
owed a duty to exercise ordinary care in furnishing his or her employee a
reasonably safe place to work.41 In addition, this duty could not be delegated
to a co-employee in order to relieve the employer from liability for the negli-
gent performance by that co-employee.42 When an employer had an employ-
ee perform an act that was non-delegable, the employee himself was acting
merely as a conduit of the employer rather than acting in his capacity as a
servant.43 Therefore, when a co-employee negligently failed to provide a safe
34. Gunnett, 70 S.W.3d at 635.
35. 1 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 33, § 2.03. The rule was established in
England by Priestly v. Fowler in the mid-nineteenth century. 150 Eng. Rep. 1030,
1031 (1837). Shortly thereafter, it was adopted by an American court in Farwell v.
Boston & Worcester Rail Rd. Corp. 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49, 59 (1842). By the end of
the century, nearly every state in the nation had recognized the defense. The Creation
of a Common Law Rule: The Fellow Servant Rule, 183 7-1860, 132 U. PA. L. REV.
579, 579 (1984). For a Missouri case recognizing the common law defense, see
Rohback v. Pac. R.R., 43 Mo. 187 (1869).
36. 27 AM. JUR. 2D Employment Relationship § 340 (2011).
37. Studebaker v. Nettie's Flower Garden, Inc., 842 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Mo. App.
E.D. 1992).
38. See McGinnis v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co., 98 S.W. 590, 592-93
(Mo. 1906).
39. Joan T.A. Gabel & Nancy R. Mansfield, Practicing in the Evolving Land-
scape of Workers' Compensation Law, 14 LAB. LAW. 73, 74 (1998).




43. See Zellars v. Mo. Water & Light Co., 92 Mo. App. 107, 125 (1902) (stating
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workplace and another employee was injured as a result thereof, liability at-
tached to the employer and not the co-employee."
The distinction between employer liability and co-employee liability
was further explained by distinguishing between a co-employee's acts that
constituted nonfeasance versus those that were misfeasance.45 A co-
employee was held personally liable to a fellow employee who sustained an
injury resulting from the co-employee's misfeasance but not his nonfea-
sance. 46 Nonfeasance is defined as "the omission on the part of the agent to
perform a duty which he owes to the principal by virtue of the relationship
existing between them."A7 If a fellow employee's injury arose from the neg-
ligent non-performance of this duty, a co-employee was not held liable.48 In
contrast, misfeasance is found in instances where an employee "has actually
entered upon the performance of his duties to his principal and in so doing,
fails to respect the rights of others . . . . [H]e will be personally responsible to
a third person who is injured by reason of such misfeasance.""9 This different
treatment between omissions of a duty and positive wrongs is premised on the
principles of privity.50 Courts held that an employee is in privity of contract
with his employer, and thus, a party external to that contractual relationship
cannot maintain an action to recover damages sustained by reason of nonper-
formance of the co-employee's contractual duty to the employer.
B. The Quid Pro Quo of the Missouri Workers'
Compensation Act of 1926
The fact that employees were granted the right to seek recovery from
their employers for a co-employee's failure to provide a safe workplace was a
small victory for injured employees in the overall context of workplace inju-
ries. Even with this limitation on employer insulation from common law
44. See id. at 125-27; see also State ex rel. Badami v. Gaertner, 630 S.W.2d 175,
178 (Mo. App. E.D. 1982) (en banc) (The court summarized co-employee liability
prior to workers' compensation as that in which "the duty to provide a safe place to
work was upon the employer, not the employee. An employee ... owed his duty to
the employer and he incurred no personal liability for failure to fulfill his duty to
provide a reasonably safe place for employees to work."), superseded by statute, S.B.
1, 93rd Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2005), as stated in Robinson v. Hooker,
323 S.W.3d 418 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010).
45. Badami, 630 S.W.2d at 178.
46. Id. at 177.
47. McCarver v. St. Joseph Lead Co., 268 S.W. 687, 690 (Mo. App. 1925) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
48. See id.
49. Orcutt v. Century Bldg. Co., 99 S.W. 1062, 1068 (Mo. 1906) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
50. Badami, 630 S.W.2d at 177.
51. See, e.g., Carson v. Quinn, 105 S.W. 1088, 1090-91 (Mo. App. 1907).
240 [Vol. 77
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remedies, workers were still unable to recover in ninety percent of cases in-
volving workplace injuries. 52 Further, if employees were fortunate enough to
obtain a judgment against their employer, they were still ill-equipped to bear
the expense and delay of litigation.53 To remedy these substantive and proce-
dural inequities, the legislature enacted the Missouri Workers' Compensation
Act.5 4
The goal of the Act is to provide an injured worker with "rapid, definite
and certain compensation for workplace injuries, and to place the burden of
such losses on the industry."55 While employer liability was extremely lim-
ited prior to the Act,56 under a workers' compensation action, an employee
need not prove any fault on the part of his or her employer in order to recover
compensation for a workplace injury.57 With respect to employer liability,
workers' compensation is not meant to supplement the rights and remedies
available at common law but rather supplant them entirely.58 Therefore, in
exchange for employers accepting absolute liability, irrespective of fault,
employees forgo the opportunity to pursue a common law action against the
employer.59 Employers are conferred a benefit because, although they must
invariably compensate their employees if they suffer an injury covered under
the Act, employers are able to avoid the possibility of paying the entire
amount of common-law damages.60 Hence, there is a greater amount of com-
52. Gunnett v. Girardier Bldg. & Realty Co., 70 S.W.3d 632, 635 (Mo. App.
E.D. 2002) (noting that in 1921, shortly before the enactment of the Workers' Com-
pensation Act, 50,000 accidents were reported but only ten percent of those employ-
ees received any compensation from their employer).
53. McCormack v. Stewart Enters., Inc., 916 S.W.2d 219, 226 (Mo. App.
W.D. 1995) ("The system was enacted to provide quick recovery to those who
were injured without their incurring the cost and delay associated with litiga-
tion."), overruled on other grounds by Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121
S.W.3d 220 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
54. Gunnett, 70 S.W.3d at 635-36 (stating that "[w]orkers' compensation statutes
were enacted to ameliorate these harsh realities").
55. Id. at 636.
56. See supra Part IlIl.A.
57. Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.120.1 (2000) (providing that "[e]very employer ...
shall be liable, irrespective of negligence, to fumish compensation . . . for personal
injury or death of the employee by accident arising out of and in the course of the
employee's employment").
58. Todd v. Goostree, 493 S.W.2d 411, 416 (Mo. App. 1973), superseded by
statute, Missouri Employers Mutual Insurance Company Act, S.B. 251, 87th Gen.
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1993), as recognized in Kasl v. Bristol Care, Inc.,
984 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 1999) (en banc).
59. Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.120.2 (providing that "[t]he rights and remedies herein
granted to an employee shall exclude all other rights and remedies of the employee . .
at common law or otherwise").
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pensable injuries, yet the amount of damages an employee otherwise could
have received at common law is often much less.
This compromise is unique to the employee and employer. Even if an
employee suffers a compensable injury under the workers' compensation
statute, the injured employee retains his common law right to bring suit
against a negligent third party for that same injury.62 Thus, after Missouri
adopted its workers' compensation statute, courts were forced to determine
whether co-employees were considered third parties under the Act.
C. The Survival of Co-Employee Liability
After Workers' Compensation
In 1931, Sylcox v. National Lead Co. became the first Missouri case to
address the issue of co-employee liability following the enactment of the
workers' compensation statute. 63 In Sylcox, an employee was being trans-
ported from his employer's workplace back to his home on the company-
provided bus. 4 The driver of the bus was also employed by the same corpo-
ration. While the plaintiff was attempting to exit the bus, his co-employee
accelerated and threw the plaintiff onto the concrete roadway.66 As a result,
the injured employee sued both his employer and co-employee for the injuries
he sustained in connection with the accident. 67
The court was forced to answer the question of whether the defendant
co-employee was a third person under the Act.68 The defendant co-employee
argued, unsuccessfully, that third persons constitute those "not in the same
61. See id. Because third parties do not partake in the give and take of the rela-
tionship and are not subject to making payments to the state's compensation fund,
limiting the immunity from common law suits to the employer is a logical outcome.
Id. at 636-37.
62. Zueck v. Oppenheimer Gateway Props., Inc., 809 S.W.2d 384, 390 (Mo.
1991) (en banc) ("Workers' compensation laws have not been barriers to suits by
injured employees against negligent third parties."). If an injury covered under the
Act is caused by a third party, after the employer fulfills its obligation to compensate
its employee, the employer has a right of subrogation. See Mo. REV. STAT. §
287.150.3. However, the subrogation interest is limited to the amount the employer
paid under the workers' compensation statute and does not include the damages avail-
able to the injured employee under common law. See Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc.
v. Royse, 125 F. Supp. 2d 375, 379 (E.D. Mo. 2000).
63. See State ex rel. Badami v. Gaertner, 630 S.W.2d 175, 178-79 (Mo. App.
E.D. 1982) (en banc), superseded by statute, S.B. 1, 93rd Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg.
Sess. (Mo. 2005), as stated in Robinson v. Hooker, 323 S.W.3d 418 (Mo. App. W.D.
2010); Sylcox v. Nat'l Lead Co., 38 S.W.2d 497 (Mo. App. E.D. 1931).
64. Sylcox, 38 S.W.2d at 498.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 499.
67. See id. at 498.
68. Id at 501.
242 [Vol. 77
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69
employ" such that immunity from civil actions also extends to co-workers.
Relying on the common law distinction between nonfeasance and misfea-
sance, the court disagreed and held that "at common law one servant is liable
to another for his own misfeasance, and there is nothing in the Compensation
Act which destroys such liability, or in any way disturbs the common-law
relationship existing between co[-]employees."70
Subsequent to this early decision, Missouri courts have consistently re-
affirmed the view that co-employees are considered third persons under the
Act and, absent limited circumstances, are amenable to a common law ac-
tion.71 The treatment of co-employee liability went largely unchanged until
1982, when the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District established
Missouri's current framework in State ex rel. Badami v. Gaertner.72
In Badami, Missouri, for the first time since adopting its workers' com-
pensation statute, addressed whether a co-employee can be held personally
liable for injuries a fellow employee sustained that were a result of the co-
employee's failure to provide a safe workplace. 73 The injury at issue in Ba-
dami occurred when the plaintiffs hand was drawn into a shredding machine
at the workplace.74 After recovering workers' compensation benefits, the
plaintiff brought suit against two supervisory co-employees for a failure to
equip appropriate safety devices. 75 The co-employees argued that the case
was governed exclusively under workers' compensation, and they moved to
76dismiss the case based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
To aid in its understanding of the Act's legislative intent, the court
looked to the state of the common law as it existed at the time the statute was
69. Id. at 501-02.
70. See id. at 502. Because the facts of the case dealt with misfeasance, despite
being implicit in its analysis, the court never expressly stated that a co-employee is
immune to common law actions if the injury was a result of his nonfeasance. See id
However, an express statement of this view was made in Badami v. Gaertner, which
has become Missouri's foundational approach for co-employee liability. See supra
notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., Tauchert v. Boatmen's Nat'l Bank of St. Louis, 849 S.W.2d 573,
574 (Mo. 1993) (en banc) (per curiam); Schumacher v. Leslie, 232 S.W.2d 913, 917-
18 (Mo. 1950) (en banc); Gardner v. Stout, 119 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Mo. 1938); Gunnett
v. Girardier Bldg. & Realty Co., 70 S.W.3d 632, 637 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002).
72. 630 S.W.2d 175 (Mo. App. E.D. 1982) (en banc), superseded by statute, S.B.
1, 93rd Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2005), as stated in Robinson v. Hooker,
323 S.W.3d 418 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010).
73. Id. at 176. As noted by the court, the subsequent cases after Sylcox holding
that an employee does not obtain employer immunity under workers' compensation
all involved instances in which the co-employee breached a personal duty owed to the
injured employee irrespective of a duty which was assigned to the co-employee by the
employer. Id. at 179.
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enacted. 77 The court found that when the Act was passed, "the duty to pro-
vide a safe place to work was upon the employer, not the employee."7 8 Con-
sequently, an employee chosen to carry out this duty owed his duty to the
employer, and thus, he incurred no personal liability for failing to fulfill this
employer-delegated duty to provide fellow employees with a reasonably safe
workplace.79 Based on this understanding of the law, the court articulated the
seminal "something more" doctrine that Missouri has since utilized in analyz-
ing co-employee liability: "Charging the employee chosen to implement the
employer's duty to provide a reasonably safe place to work merely with the
general failure to fulfill that duty charges no actionable negligence. Some-
thing more must be charged."80 The court held that the plaintiffs action fell
squarely within the contemplated instance where a plaintiff does not allege
something more than a mere failure to provide a safe workplace and dis-
missed the civil action accordingly. 8 1
After Badami, the Supreme Court of Missouri consistently retained the
"something more" framework when the issue of co-employee liability arose.
However, what constitutes "something more" in terms of providing a safe
workplace is very fact-specific and susceptible to reasonable disagreement.82
The Badami court even recognized that the "extent and nature" of an alleged
breach of duty by a co-employee can only be determined on a "case-by-case
basis."83 In response, the Supreme Court of Missouri has attempted to further
delineate the moment a co-employee's actions constitute "something more."
The Supreme Court of Missouri decided two cases in 1993 concerning
the "something more" doctrine after a number of appellate decisions subse-
quent to Badami applied the test with less than uniform results.84 In Tauchert
v. Boatmen 's National Bank of St. Louis, the court discussed the "something
more" test in terms of affirmative negligent acts. The plaintiff in Tauchert
was injured at his workplace when he fell down an elevator shaft while stand-
ing on the top of an elevator cab.86 Prior to his accident, the plaintiff s super-
77. Id. at 178.
78. Id.
79. Id. The court noted that the failure to provide a safe workplace was also
framed in terms of nonfeasance by courts at the time the Act was passed. See id at
179. The court acknowledged that courts in Missouri no longer distinguish between
misfeasance and nonfeasance. See id. at 178. However, since the elimination of the
distinction occurred subsequent to the statute's enactment, this change in agency and
tort law developed "independent of our compensation legislation." See id.
80. Id. at 180 (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 181.
82. See generally Paul J. Passanante & Sara Stock, Help! We're Lost! Co-
Employee Immunity in Missouri, 57 J. Mo. B. 64 (2001).
83. Badami, 630 S.W.2d at 180-81.
84. Passanante & Stock, supra note 82, at 66-67.
85. 849 S.W.2d 573, 574 (Mo. 1993) (en banc) (per curiam).
86. Id. at 573.
244 [Vol. 77
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vising co-employee personally rigged up a makeshift system to raise the ele-
vator, which ultimately failed and was the cause of the elevator cab falling.87
The plaintiff brought a personal injury action against his co-employee, which
the co-employee defended by claiming that the accident was the result of
nothing more than the employer's non-delegable failure to provide a safe
workplace, and consequently, was within the exclusive jurisdiction of work-
ers' compensation. The court disagreed, finding that the defendant co-
employee not only passively allowed a hazardous working condition, but also
affirmatively engaged in creating that condition, which represented more than
an employer's failure to provide a safe workplace.89 The court held that such
affirmative acts constituted a breach of a personal duty of care owed to the
plaintiff, and therefore, the co-employee was not immune from liability under
workers' compensation.90
The court's holding in Tauchert was not entirely novel or without com-
mon law support in that, at common law, misfeasance was described as being
a positive wrong whereas nonfeasance was framed as an omission.9 1 Viewed
in light of this historical treatment, Tauchert's use of affirmative negligent
acts creating an unsafe workplace in order to find "something more" was
entirely consistent.
The Supreme Court of Missouri next addressed co-employee liability in
Kelley v. DeKalb Energy Co. 92 The facts in Kelley were similar to those in
Tauchert insofar as they dealt with a hazardous condition at the workplace. 93
The plaintiff in Kelley was severely burned when a corn flamer manufactured
by his employer exploded. 94 After recovering workers' compensation bene-
fits, the plaintiff brought a personal injury action against five of his co-
employees.95 One of the plaintiffs co-employees initially presented the de-
sign of the corn flamer to executives of the employer who subsequently
adopted the design for use at the workplace.96 Thereafter, the employer built
twenty corn flamers and used the equipment for four years leading up to the
plaintiff s injury.9 7
Under these facts, the plaintiff asserted that the negligent design, manu-
facture, and construction of the corn flamer by his co-employees was actiona-
ble as being an affirmative negligent act outside of the employer's duty to
87. Id. at 574.
88. Id. at 573-74.
89. Id. at 574.
90. Id.
91. See supra Part IIl.A.
92. 865 S.W.2d 670 (Mo. 1993) (en banc).
93. See id. at 671.
94. Id. Corn flamers are "flame-making machines" which are mounted "on trac-
tors, for the purpose of flaming corn plants just enough to retard their growth." Id
95. See id
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provide a safe place to work.98 The court disagreed, and it distinguished its
holding from that in Tauchert by focusing on the fact that the hazardous con-
dition in that case occurred when the defendant co-employee personally mod-
ified the instrument that led to the plaintiffs injury.99 In contrast, in Kelley,
the corn flamer was the result of a company-wide policy, which had been in
effect for a significant period of time.1oo Thus, the breach was that of the
employer for a failure to provide a safe workplace and, accordingly, could not
be delegated to co-employees in order to expose them to personal liability.o10
Nearly a decade passed before the Supreme Court of Missouri again
ruled on the issue of co-employee liability in State ex rel. Taylor v. Wal-
lace.102 In Taylor, the plaintiff was riding on the rear of a trash truck driven
by his co-employee. 0 3 The vehicle struck a mailbox, which caused the plain-
tiff to fall and incur personal injuries.' In determining whether the conduct
represented an affirmative negligent act, the court found that the employee's
duty to drive safely, delegated to him by his employer, was no more than an
extension of the duty to furnish a safe workplace. 05 As a result, the court
held that the co-employee was immune to a common law action.106
The Supreme Court of Missouri's most recent treatment of co-employee
liability occurred in Burns v. Smith.107 The plaintiff in Burns sustained his
workplace injury when the water pressure tank on the side of his concrete
truck exploded. 08 Prior to the accident, the plaintiffs supervisor noticed
multiple leaks in the truck's pressure tank and welded the corroded portions
of the tank shut.109 To test the soundness of the weld, the plaintiffs supervis-
ing co-employee directed him to get in the truck and "[r]un it till it blows."" 0
98. Id. at 671-72.
99. Id. at 672.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 73 S.W.3d 620 (Mo. 2002) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by
McCracken v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, 298 S.W.3d 473 (Mo. 2009).
103. Id. at 621 & n.2.
104. Id.
105. See id. at 622.
106. See id. Some have stated that the court's decision in Taylor has blurred the
line between nonfeasance and misfeasance when deciding whether a co-employee's
actions arise to "something more." See Michael S. Kruse, Comment, The Current
State of Co-Employee Immunity Under Workers' Compensation Law, 70 Mo. L. REV.
1315, 1330 (2005) (noting the blurred distinction but offering the clarification that
"[a]lithough the employee engaged in the negligent act of careless driving, this type of
action was viewed as nonfeasance because the co-employee was, in effect, simply not
carrying out his employer's nondelegable duty to provide a reasonably safe work-
place.").
107. 214 S.W.3d 335 (Mo. 2007) (en banc).
108. Id. at 336.
109. Id.
I 10. See id.
246 [Vol. 77
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The court's decision in Burns often garners more interest based on what
it did not hold as opposed to what it actually did hold. Specifically, the de-
fendant asked the court to adopt a reasonable person test, which a number of
Missouri Court of Appeals cases had implemented."' Applying the reasona-
ble person standard, the defendant co-employee claimed that the practice of
welding tanks is commonplace in the industry, and therefore, those engaged
in the business would recognize his actions as reasonable and non-
hazardous.l 12 The court declined to add a reasonableness element to the test
and instead reaffirmed the "something more" test as stated in Badami and
subsequent decisions." 3  Under the traditional "something more" analysis,
the court held that directing a co-employee to encounter a hazard constituted
an affirmative negligent act that created an additional danger beyond that
normally faced in the job-specific workplace."14
In sum, Missouri has retained the common law treatment of whether a
co-employee can be held personally liable by a fellow employee based on the
understanding of the legislature, as it existed when workers' compensation
was first enacted.'us In addition, the Supreme Court of Missouri has applied
the "something more" test to individual factual scenarios to help give contex-
tual guidance. Based on the foundational "something more" test and the
court's subsequent treatment, the state of the law in which Robinson was de-
cided requires "an affirmative act that creates additional danger beyond that
normally faced in the job-specific work environment."I 17 Thus, cases that
have recognized that the "something more" element is met usually involve
instances where the co-employee "was present with the plaintiff and was per-
forming an act or operating a piece of equipment that resulted in the injury, or
employees were directed to engage in dangerous conditions that a reasonable
111. Id. at 338-39 (the offered standard for determining whether "something
more" occurred would require courts "to review directives given by supervisors to
employees that required those employees to engage in dangerous activities beyond the
scope of their usual duties" to determine if "what occurred was hazardous beyond the
usual requirements of employment").
112. Id. at 339.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 340. The court chose not to answer whether the act of welding the
pressure tank, in and of itself, would have been sufficient to find something more
because the co-employee's direction to run the tank till it blew clearly met the test.
Id.
115. See State ex rel. Badami v. Gaertner, 630 S.W. 175, 179-80 (Mo. App. E.D.
1982) (en banc), superseded by statute, S.B. 1, 93rd Gen. Assemb., Ist Reg. Sess.
(Mo. 2005), as stated in Robinson v. Hooker, 323 S.W.3d 418 (Mo. App. W.D.
2010).
116. See supra notes 80-114 and accompanying text.
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person would recognize as hazardous beyond the usual requirements of em-
ployment."' 18
D. Putting Missouri's Co-Employee Liability into Perspective
By only granting immunity to co-employees in the singular circum-
stance in which they fail to provide a safe workplace, Missouri is in the "dis-
tinct minority of jurisdictions" that allow negligence actions to be brought
against co-employees." 9 Representing the most liberal approach to immuni-
ty, several states allow co-employees to be immune from personal liability
even if they commit an intentional tort.120 However, the vast majority of
states allow co-employees to be immune from civil action unless the fellow
employee's injury was the result of an intentional wrong.12 1 Further down the
spectrum, a few states draw the line at gross negligence and only allow co-
employee immunity if it does not rise to that level.122 That leaves Missouri as
one of only eight states that extends immunity to co-employees only insofar
as the co-employee's negligent act occurs in furtherance of his or her em-
ployer's duty to provide a safe work environment.123
The fact that Missouri represents the bookend as the most amenable for
co-employee liability is not a random creation but rather compelled by the
very nature of workers' compensation. Stated alternatively, courts have rec-
ognized that if employees were permitted to bring negligence actions against
their own co-employees for a mere failure to effectuate the employer's duty to
provide a safe workplace, such an approach would conflict with the underly-
ing purpose of workers' compensation statutes.124 This self-evident result is
predicated on the principle of employer indemnification. 125 Either by con-
tract or by virtue of agency law, there are instances in which an employee's
negligence may require indemnification by his or her employer. In such
118. Sexton v. Jenkins & Assocs., Inc., 41 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000).
119. See Hedglin v. Stahl Specialty Co., 903 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Mo. App. W.D.
1995).
120. 6 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 33, at § 111.03[l] & n.1; see, e.g., N.Y.
WORKERS' COMP. LAW § 29(6) (West, Westlaw through L.201 1) (stating that "[t]he
right to compensation or benefits under this chapter, shall be the exclusive remedy to
an employee . .. when such employee is injured or killed by the negligence or wrong
of another in the same employ. . . .").
121. See 6 LARSON& LARSON, supra note 33, at § 111.03[1] &n.1 (providing that
thirty-five states have either by statute or judicial decision held that co-employee
immunity extends up to intentional torts).
122. Id. § 111.03[1].
123. See id.
124. Hedglin, 903 S.W.2d at 929.
125. See id.
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circumstances, the employer is responsible for the worker's compensation
claim and will also be forced to pay the employee's common law judg-
ment.127 If an injured employee is able to bring a civil suit against his co-
employee for a failure to provide a safe workplace, an employer may be re-
quired to indemnify the co-employee, "thus effectively emasculating the im-
munity granted to employers from civil liability."1 28  Although workers'
compensation was structured to be a compromise, this would represent the
employer giving guaranteed compensation but not receiving the immunity for
civil suit in return.1 29
Thus, to uphold the integrity of workers' compensation, co-employees
must be immune to civil suit, at the very least, when performing the employ-
er's non-delegable duty to provide a safe workplace. As a result, and as case
law in Missouri indicates, when determining whether a co-employee is liable
under the Act, courts focus on whether the alleged breach was by an employ-
er or employee, as determined by the nature of that duty.' 30 This approach
had been consistent until the court's decision in Robinson v. Hooker. Specifi-
cally, instead of distinguishing between duties, the court in Robinson chose to
determine whether the statutory definition of "employer" includes a co-
employee - a distinction no Missouri court had ever relied on prior to the
decision. 131
E. Looking Through the Lens of Strict Construction
In fairness to the Robinson court, its doctrinal shift was not the result of
an unprovoked, random decision. Instead, the Missouri legislature's 2005
amendment to the Workers' Compensation Act was the impetus that prompt-
ed such an unforeseen holding.
The permissive nature of Missouri's co-employee liability is indicative
of the perception of the Act as a whole leading up to its 2005 amendments.
Formerly, courts liberally construed the provisions of the Act, favoring cov-
erage of the statute to injured employees.132 In 2005, the legislature changed
the Act by narrowing the definitions of "injury," "accident," and "injury aris-
ing out of and in the course of"; it also altered the interpretation of the Act by
requiring strict statutory construction rather than liberal statutory construc-
tion.133 The intended and actual effect of the amendments was to limit em-
ployers' exposure to workers' compensation claims and create an attractive
127. Hedglin, 903 S.W.2d at 929.
128. Michael B. Korte, Workers' Compensation Law and Practice, 29 Mo. PRAC.
§ 8.10 (2010).
129. See id.
130. Gunnett v. Girardier Bldg. & Realty Co., 70 S.W.3d 632, 637 (Mo. App.
E.D. 2002).
131. See infra Part IV.
132. Allcorn v. Tap Enters., Inc., 277 S.W.3d 823, 830 (Mo. App. S.D. 2009).
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environment for business development in Missouri. 134 The amendments were
thought to be so beneficial to employers and so restrictive to employees that
they prompted constitutional challenges.' 35 However, while the cumulative
effect of the amendments limited businesses' exposure, strict construction
ultimately reared its head and elicited unintended consequences with the
court's decision in Robinson v. Hooker.
In Robinson, the court's interpretation of section 287.120 eliminated the
co-employee liability immunity previously available under Badami and its
progeny. In Missouri, the availability to file a civil action against a co-
employee was always possible when the plaintiff alleged his co-employee
breached a personal duty of care.' 3 7 As recognized in Badami, the ability to
sue a co-employee requires a plaintiff to prove something more than a breach
of the employer's non-delegable duty to provide a safe workplace.' 3 How-
ever, as a result of the Robinson decision, co-employees no longer even pos-
sess immunity from civil suits for a failure to provide a safe workplace;13 9
effectively abrogating Missouri's century-old approach to co-employee liabil-
ity. 140
IV. INSTANT DECISION
After deciding that the trial court had jurisdiction to rule on the defend-
ant's motion to dismiss,141 the court began its analysis by providing the back-
134. Wilbur Tomlinson, No Coworker Immunity - More Casualties in the Work-
ers' Comp War, 20 Mo. EMP. L. LETrER, Oct. 2010, at 1, 1.; see also Kelly Wiese,
Ruling by Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District Moves Diseases out of Work-
ers' Comp, Mo. LAW. MEDIA, Feb. 1, 2010 (stating that in 2005 "[1]awmakers quickly
pushed through changes ... revamping a workers' comp system that leaders believed
had tilted too far toward injured workers, imposing too high of costs on businesses").
135. See Mo. Alliance for Retired Ams. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus. Relations, 277
S.W.3d 670, 673 (Mo. 2009) (en banc).
136. See Robinson v. Hooker, 323 S.W.3d 418, 423 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010), trans-
fer denied, No. SC91216, 2010 Mo. LEXIS 291 (2010) (Mo. Nov. 16, 2010).
137. See supra Part Ill.C.
138. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
139. Robinson, 323 S.W.3d at 425.
140. See supra, Part II.
141. Robinson, 323 S.W.3d at 422. The court noted that in McCracken v. Wal-
Mart Stores East, LP, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that the Workers' Com-
pensation Act could not overrule article V, section 14 of the Missouri Constitution,
giving circuit courts jurisdiction over personal injury claims. Id. Therefore, any
claim of immunity under the Act should be raised as an affirmative defense rather
than being raised in a motion to dismiss. Id. However, since McCracken was decided
while the instant case was pending, the court found that the defendant's claim of im-
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ground to Missouri's co-employee immunity.' 42 The court stated that, histor-
ically, Missouri courts have extended employers' immunity under the Act to
co-employees for breach of a non-delegable duty to provide a safe place to
work.143 However, as the court noted, the judicial extension of immunity to
co-employees was based on the pre-2005 version of the Act, which mandated
that the Act "shall be liberally construed with a view to the public wel-
fare."'4
Turning to amended section 287.800, the court explained that the re-
quirement of liberal construction had been eliminated.145 The court pointed
out that section 287.800 now provides that courts "shall construe the provi-
sions [of the Workers' Compensation Act] strictly."l46 Expounding on the
amendments made to the Act, the court then went on to apply the principles
of strict construction to the relevant terms of the Act.147
Because the first paragraph of section 287.120 refers to immunity ex-
tending to employers and there is no related provision releasing employees
from liability, the court found that the extension of immunity ultimately de-
pends on the meaning of the term "employer" as it is used in the statute.i1s
The court stated that for a co-employee to be able to share the immunity
granted under the Act, he or she must be a "person . . . using the service of
another for pay" and "hav[e] five or more employees." 49 In attempting to
understand the legislature's intent, the court relied on "the plain and ordinary
language of the statute."'150 While the legislature did not alter the language of
the exclusivity provision, the meaning of that language and the scope of em-
ployer immunity, as the court explained, was narrowed "by the new lens of
strict construction."' 5' The court concluded that co-employees do not fall
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 423 (emphasis added).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 424-25.
148. Id.
The Act defines "employer". . . as:
(1) Every person, partnership, association, corporation, limited liability
partnership or company, trustee, receiver, the legal representatives of a
deceased employer, and every other person, including any person or cor-
poration operating a railroad and any public service corporation, using the
service of another for pay;
(3) Any of the above-defined employers must have five or more employ-
ees to be deemed an employer for the purposes of this chapter ....
Id. at 424 (quoting Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.030.1 (2000)) (emphasis omitted).
149. Id. at 424 (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 287.030.1) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
150. Id.
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within the plain and ordinary meaning of "employer" as defined under the
Act and, consequently, "are not entitled to invoke the employer immunity
under [s]ection 287.120."l152
After holding that the circuit court erred in dismissing the plaintiff s pe-
tition by relying on the employer immunity provision, the court next ad-
dressed whether there was a valid alternate ground for dismissal."' Of the
two remaining grounds for dismissal, the court first analyzed the defendant's
assertion that res judicata barred the cause of action because of the workers'
compensation claim settlement.' 54  The court found the defense was not
available since res judicata only bars claims that are previously litigated be-
tween the same parties; in the instant case, both the claims and the parties
were different from the workers' compensation action and the civil suit.I5s
The court lastly discussed the applicability of the official immunity de-
fense.'5 6 Since the defendant was merely working beside the plaintiff when
the injury occurred rather than operating a supervisory role, the court main-
tained that the threshold requirement demonstrating that the defendant was a
public official was not met.157 Since the defendant was not a public official,
nor was she performing a discretionary act at the time the injury occurred, the
court held that she was not entitled to official immunity.
In summary, the court held that the trial court's order granting the de-
fendant's motion to dismiss was in error.159 The court found that the judicial
extension of immunity to co-employees was no longer justified in light of
strictly construing "employer" as it is defined under the Act. 1o Moreover, no
152. Id. at 424.
153. Id. at 425.
154. Id. at 426-27.
155. See id. at 425. Specifically, in the workers' compensation proceeding, the
plaintiff "sought permanent partial disability benefits . . . to cover his loss of income
and medical expenses from his work-related injury," while in the instant case he sued
his co-worker for her personal negligence and sought "compensation for pain and
suffering, loss of consortium, and other tort-related damages that are not available
under the Workers' Compensation Act." Id. With respect to barring claims against
the same party, the court relied on its earlier conclusion in holding that the defendant
did not fall under the term "employer" as it is defined in the statute. Id Because the
plaintiff settled his claim with his employer, not his co-employee, the court reasoned
that the employer and co-employee are two different parties and, therefore, the plain-
tiff could still sue the defendant for personal negligence. See id.
156. Id. at 426-27.
157. Id. at 426. Even had the defendant established the she was a public official,
the court stated that she still would have to show that "she was performing a discre-
tionary act and not a ministerial act." Id. The court reasoned that operating a high
pressure hose was more in line with a ministerial act as opposed to a discretionary act.
See id at 426-27.
158. Id. at 427.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 424-26.
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other grounds for dismissal were warranted under the facts of the case.,61
Subsequent to the decision, on September 28, 2010, the appellate court denied
a motion for rehearing on the issue. 162 The decision ultimately became bind-
ing when the Supreme Court of Missouri denied a motion to hear the case on
November 16, 2010.163
In response to the court's holding in Robinson, both the Missouri Senate
and Missouri House of Representatives introduced bills as a legislative fix to
restrict co-employee liability and restore the corresponding immunity. Senate
Bill 8 was introduced just a few months after the Robinson decision and was
passed by the Senate on March 17, 2011.'" As originally introduced, the
statute would have restored the co-employee liability standard back to its
previous state in that co-employees would be amenable to civil suit only if
something more than a breach of an employer's non-delegable duty is al-
leged.'6 1
The introduction of Senate Bill 8 was followed by House Bill 162,
which would have broadened co-employee immunity past any level ever pos-
sessed in Missouri. Specifically, the proposed bill provided immunity to co-
employees for any act that caused an "injury or death for which compensation
is recoverable under this chapter."i 66 Under this language, the bill would
have allowed co-employee immunity even in instances of intentional
wrongs. In that respect, it would change the landscape of Missouri's co-
161. See id at 427.
162. Id. at 418.
163. See id.
164. Measure to Protect Employees Advances in the Missouri Legislature, MO.
SENATE NEWSROOM (Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.senate.mo.gov/Newsroom/Docu
ments/PressReleases/20 1/SenateBill8-031711 .htm (providing that the Senate acted
swiftly and introduced the bill on January 5, 2011, the first day of the Senate's ses-
sion).
165. See S.B. 8, 96th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2011). The bill provided, in
relevant part:
Co-employees shall be released from liability for negligence in perform-
ing the non-delegable duty of an employer to provide a safe workplace
when the negligence contributes to a co-employee's personal injury or
death by accident arising out of and in the course of the injured or de-
ceased employee's employment, unless the co-employee engaged in pur-
poseful, affirmatively, dangerous conduct.
Id
166. H.B. 162, 96th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2011). The bill provided, in
relevant part:
The employer, or employee of such employer, shall not be liable for any
injury or death for which compensation is recoverable under this chapter
and shall be released from all other liability therefor whatsoever, whether
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employee liability from one of the most permissive states to one of the most
restrictive.
More importantly, each bill was meant to remedy the void created by the
Robinson decision. Proponents of the Senate's bill asserted that it would
restore the status quo by expressly reinstating the "something more" test
within the legislative text. Proponents of the House Bill argued that allow-
ing any co-employee liability seriously undermines the exclusive remedy
provision of the Act, and thus a blanket exclusion is preferable. 170
On May 13, 2011, the last day of the legislative session, the Missouri
Senate proposed a version of the bill that provided a compromise between the
original versions of Senate Bill 8 and House Bill 162.171 Specifically, the
version did not provide co-employee immunity for all conduct that causes an
injury covered under the Act; it did limit co-employee liability to intentional
acts.172 The relevant portion amending section 287.120.1 stated that:
Any employee of such employer shall not be liable for any injury
or death for which compensation is recoverable under this chapter
and every employer and employees of such employer shall be re-
leased from all other liability therefor whatsoever, whether to the
employee or any other person, except that an employee shall not be
released from liability for injury or death if the employee engaged
in an affirmative negligent act that purposefully and dangerously
caused or increased the risk of injury.
This legislation would have extended co-employee immunity past any
level that Missouri has historically provided.174 Under this language, not only
would co-employees be immune for negligently failing to fulfill the employ-
er's duty of providing a safe workplace as they were prior to Robinson, they
168. See supra Part 11I.D.
169. See Missouri Bills Address Employee Liability in Workers' Comp, INSJ, Apr. 1,
2011) http://www.insurancejoumal.com/news/midwest/2011/04/01/192763.htm [here-
inafter Missouri Bills]. Compare S.B. 8 (text providing that co-employees will be
released from liability in performing the employer's non-delegable duty to provide a
safe workplace unless they engage in conduct that is "purposeful, affirmatively dan-
gerous conduct") with Tauchert v. Boatmen's Nat'l Bank of St. Louis, 849 S.W.2d
573, 574 (Mo. 1993) (en banc) (defining something more as an "affirmative negligent
act" which is "not merely a breach of an employer's duty to provide a safe place to
work").
170. See Missouri Bills, supra note 169.
171. See Senate Bill 8 Summary, Mo. SENATE, http://www.senate.mo.gov/llinfo/
BTSWeb/Actions.aspx?SessionType=R&BiIIID= 4065316 (last visited Nov. 30,
2011).
172. See S.B. 8, 96th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (as passed by Senate, Mo. May
13, 2011), available at http://www.senate.mo.gov/l linfo/pdf-bill/reperf/SB8.pdf.
173. Id.
174. See supra Part Ill.D.
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would be immune from civil action as long as their fellow employee's injury
was not the result of an intentional act. In that respect, the proposed amend-
ment would have placed Missouri in accord with the majority of states' ap-
proaches to co-employee liability.175
Debate of the workers' compensation amendments continued into the
legislative session's final hours, but ultimately the bill did not pass.'7 6 The
reason for the bill's failure was unrelated to the amendments concerning co-
employee immunity.177 Thus, if the legislature does amend co-employee
immunity during its next session, this language is likely representative of the
type of amendment that would occur. Further, most consider legislative ac-
tion with respect to co-employee immunity a top priority going forward.178
Notably absent from the proposed legislation is any mention of retroac-
tive application of the amended statute. As a result, if the legislature were to
provide for co-employee immunity, it may only apply prospectively.179
Therefore, even if the legislature is able to amend the Act in the next legisla-
tive session to expressly provide for co-employee immunity, absent a deci-
sion by the Supreme Court of Missouri ruling otherwise, Robinson's interpre-
tation of co-employee liability may still be binding on a large amount of cur-
rent and potential defendants.' 80
V. COMMENT
The court in Robinson overturned nearly one hundred years of judicial
precedent when it decided to focus on the strict classification of "employer"
and "co-employee" as opposed to determining whether a duty existed. This
Part will examine whether that extensive departure was supported by Mis-
souri's approach to co-employee liability and the legislative intent of Mis-
souri's 2005 amendments requiring strict interpretation. After illustrating that
the holding is not in accord with either, this Part will examine the temporal
and jurisdictional scope of Robinson. Finally, this Part will analyze whether
175. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
176. Chamber Calls Session Success, Cites $200m in Savings, Mo. NEWS
HORIZON (May 14, 2011), http://missouri-news.org/press-releases/chamber-calls-
session-success-cites-200m-in-savings/4990.
177. Id. ("The Senate presented a position that did not include the occupational
disease language, which made the bill unacceptable for the business community.").
178. See, e.g., Missouri Court of Appeals Strikes Another Blow at Employer Im-
munity Under the Workers' Compensation Act, CLIENT ALERT (Spencer Fane Britt &
Browne LLP, Kansas City, Mo.) Sept. 19, 2011, available at htip://www.spencerfane.
com/News/Headline.asp?Key-309 ("Efforts to address this issue through legislative
changes were unsuccessful in the 2011 General Assembly, but will likely be revived
in the next legislative session.").
179. See infra Part V.B.
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the unintended consequences of Robinson are indicative of a larger problem
with the statutory construction of workers' compensation in Missouri.
A. Did Robinson Get it Right?
1. Analyzing Robinson v. Hooker Under Current Case Law
As discussed in Badami and illustrated by the four Supreme Court of
Missouri cases decided in its wake, an injured worker may not maintain a
civil action at common law against his co-employee merely for furnishing an
unsafe workplace. 8 1 Something more must be alleged. 182 In contrast, im-
munity is not granted when a co-employee breaches a personal duty of care,
which is personally owed to the employee by that co-employee.' 8 When
considering the facts of the instant decision, that is precisely the type of fac-
tual predicate on which the Robinson court decided the case.
Robinson v. Hooker is not an instance where the co-employee failed to
discharge a duty that was delegated by the employer. At the time of the acci-
dent, the defendant, Hooker, was not carrying out a general, non-delegable
duty of her employer. Rather, Hooker was performing a personal, albeit em-
ployment-related duty.184 Specifically, Hooker was operating a high pressure
hose when she lost her grip, and the hose struck her coworker, causing partial
blindness.18 Accordingly, she had a personal, common law duty to exercise
reasonable care in handling the pressure hose. As discussed, cases that have
recognized that the "something more" element was met usually involved in-
stances where the co-employee "was present with the plaintiff and was per-
forming an act or operating a piece of equipment that resulted in the inju-
ry."l 8 6 This is exactly what occurred in the instant case. The plaintiff and
defendant were working together, the defendant was operating a piece of
equipment, and the defendant's negligent operation of the equipment ulti-
mately caused the plaintiff s injury.
Thus, Missouri case law makes it clear that Robinson, while sound on its
facts because it involved the breach of a personal duty of care, used improper
reasoning to come to its conclusion. Specifically, instead of determining
whether the statutory definition of "employer" includes a co-employee
(which no court previously held), the court should have focused on whether
181. See supra Part II.C.
182. State ex rel. Badami v. Gaertner, 630 S.W.2d 175, 180 (Mo. App. E.D. 1982)
(en banc), superseded by statute, S.B. 1, 93rd Gen. Assemb., Ist Reg. Sess. (Mo.
2005), as stated in Robinson v. Hooker, 323 S.W.3d 418 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010).
183. See id. at 180-81.
184. Robinson v. Hooker, 323 S.W.3d 418, 421 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010), transfer
denied, No. SC91216, 2010 Mo. LEXIS 291 (2010) (Mo. Nov. 16, 2010).
185. Id
186. Sexton v. Jenkins & Assocs. Inc., 41 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000).
187. Robinson, 323 S.W.3d at 421.
[Vol. 77256
22
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 77, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol77/iss1/9
THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION LOOPHOLE
the alleged breach was by an employer or employee, as determined by the
nature of that duty. Since this analysis, however, is ultimately a construction
of the workers' compensation statute, it is also important that the case law is
consistent with a strict interpretation of the Act.
2. Analyzing Robinson v. Hooker Under Statutory Law
In applying any statute, the overarching goal is to give effect to the in-
tent of the legislature, which courts accomplish through statutory interpreta-
tion.'8 However, only upon statutory ambiguity can courts apply rules of
construction.189 While courts must certainly follow statutory definitions and
give words their "plain and ordinary meaning,"l 90 ambiguity is not solely
concerned with "whether a particular word in a statute, considered in isola-
tion, is ambiguous, but whether the statute itself is ambiguous."'9i Thus, a
well-defined or unambiguous word by itself may become ambiguous "in the
context of the entire statute in which it appears," 92 including when the lan-
guage "would lead to an illogical result."' 93 In these circumstances, "the
ultimate guide is the intent of the legislature." 94 Thus, a strict interpretation
still must not provide an illogical result and must be in accordance with legis-
lative intent. 95
Under these rules of interpretation, the most sensible interpretation of
Missouri's current workers' compensation statute is that statutory immunity
for co-employees is based upon the particular nature of the underlying duty
and not simply whether they fit neatly under the definition of "employer" or
"co-employee." As the court found in Robinson, the definition of "employer"
in section 287.030 unambiguously defines an employer in a manner that does
not include any employees: "Every person, partnership, association, corpora-
tion . .. using the service of another for pay." 96 However, if one were to
188. See Cook v. Newman, 142 S.W.3d 880, 886 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004) (en
banc).
189. Id.
190. Landman v. Ice Cream Specialties, Inc., 107 S.W.3d 240, 251 (Mo. 2003)
(en banc), overruled on other grounds by Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121
S.W.3d 220 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
191. J.B. Vending Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, 54 S.W.3d 183, 187 (Mo. 2001) (en
banc).
192. Id.
193. State ex rel. Broadway-Washington Assocs., Ltd. v. Manners, 186 S.W.3d
272, 275 (Mo. 2006) (en banc).
194. Lincoln Indus., Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 51 S.W.3d 462, 465 (Mo. 2001) (en
banc).
195. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 366 (2011).
196. Robinson v. Hooker, 323 S.W.3d 418, 424-25 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010) (em-
phasis omitted) (quoting Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.030.1(1) (2000)), transfer denied, No.




Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2012
AflSSOURI LAW REVIEW
look at the definition of employer "in the context of the entire statute in which
it appears" it becomes evident that relying on strict interpretation of this defi-
nition in isolation yields "illogical results."
The purpose of Missouri's workers' compensation law is "to place upon
industry the losses sustained by employees resulting from injuries arising out
of and in the course of employment."' 97 The Act represents an exchange in
interests: the employee is given certain compensation without a need to prove
fault while the employer is protected from the uncertainty of common-law
damages.'9 In essence, the employer assumes absolute liability for a broad
range of injuries beyond that recognized at common law, yet receives protec-
tion from having to pay out the full possibility of common-law damages.' 99
With this in mind, it becomes unavoidably clear that a categorical "employer"
or "employee" analysis without regard to the nature of the duties performed
would circumvent the fundamental purpose of the workers' compensation
statute. Such an interpretation would "lead to an illogical result," even
though the plain meaning of the term "employer" is not ambiguous by it-
self.200 Particularly with concern to the non-delegable duty to provide a safe
workplace, employees would be unable to satisfy this duty without personally
assuming the duty themselves. Thus, there would be no pure give-and-take,
as plaintiffs could both place upon industry losses sustained as well as collect
common law remedies from co-employees that were required to act in order
to satisfy the employer's non-delegable duty.
This illogical result is most readily apparent when considering the ac-
tions of an employee working within a corporation. A corporation is an arti-
ficial creature of the law, and, therefore, it can "only speak and act through its
agents and employees." 20 1 Thus, any act by an "employer" will necessarily
be a result of an action by its employee. To treat this activity as something
different than employer action (which would otherwise be immune under
workers' compensation) is against the purpose of the statute.202
The illogical results of focusing on the dichotomy between an employer
and employee are even more apparent when viewing the consequences the
Robinson holding has on Missouri employers. The Robinson construction of
the workers' compensation statute severely limits employers' protection from
common-law suit because, in many circumstances, employers are contractual-
ly or legally obligated to indemnify employees for judgments rendered
203
against them. Even when indemnification is not compulsory, if the em-
197. Schoemehl v. Treasurer, 217 S.W.3d 900, 901 (Mo. 2007) (en banc).
198. See supra notes 56-60 and cases cited therein.
199. See supra notes 56-60 and cases cited therein.
200. See State ex rel. Broadway-Washington Ass'n, Ltd. v. Manners, 186 S.W.3d
272, 275 (Mo. 2006) (en banc).
201. See Blasinay v. Albert Wenzlick Real Estate Co., 138 S.W.2d 721, 725 (Mo.
App. St. Louis 1940).
202. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 125-27 and cases cited therein.
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ployer chooses not to indemnify its employee, "the employer risks creating
morale problems by appearing to be disloyal to its workers." 204 In each cir-
cumstance, the employer is subject to either a direct or indirect cost resulting
from a civil lawsuit. The basic scheme of workers' compensation is to grant
employers immunity from any costs arising from civil suits.205 Consequently,
a rule allowing a co-employee to be sued for a failure to provide a safe work-
place tends to undermine the basic scheme of the workers' compensation
statutes. A statutory construction that displaces the very foundation on which
the statute is based upon is illogical.
Since ambiguity is readily present, it is next necessary to consider the
legislature's intent with respect to the 2005 amendments requiring strict con-
struction of the workers' compensation statute. The very nature of strict in-
terpretation evinces that the legislature intended to restrict workers' compen-
sation recovery and employers' corresponding costs in order to create a more
favorable environment for employers.206 In addition, aided by hindsight, the
fact that the legislature acted so expediently to address the Robinson court's
207decision lends considerable support to this conclusion.
Furthermore, when the legislature enacts or amends a statute with terms
that have or have had particular judicial meanings, "a presumption exists that
[the legislature] acts with knowledge of that judicial or legislative action."208
Since courts presume that the legislature acts with knowledge of prior judicial
meanings,209 it is reasonable to infer that a lack of legislative amendment in
2005 with regard to the court's practice of distinguishing employer and em-
ployees based upon the nature of the duty indicates legislative intent for it to
210
continue. The "something more" doctrine is of judicial origin, and an act
of the legislature to change the method of judicial construction does not ne-
cessitate a corresponding judicial shift away from the prior doctrine. Had the
legislature wished to directly change the substantive law concerning co-
employee liability, which has been in existence longer than the Act itself, the
legislature would have explicitly done so.
From these rules of statutory construction, it becomes quite clear that
there is no actionable wrong when an employee purportedly breaches the
employer's non-delegable duty of providing a safe workplace. Under Mis-
204. Hedglin v. Stahl Specialty Co., 903 S.W.2d 922, 929 (Mo. App. W.D. 1995).
205. Gunnett v. Girardier Bldg. & Realty Co., 70 S.W.3d 632, 636 (Mo. App.
E.D. 2002).
206. See supra Part Ill.E.
207. See supra Part IV (discussing the Missouri Senate and House of Representa-
tives' proposed legislative fixes).
208. Cook v. Newman, 142 S.W.3d 880, 889-90 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004) (en bane).
209. Id.
210. See State ex rel. Badami v. Gaertner, 630 S.W.2d 175, 178-79 (Mo. App.
E.D. 1982) (en banc), superseded by statute, S.B. 1, 93rd Gen. Assemb., Ist Reg.
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souri case law, the breach of this duty constitutes a breach by the employer,
not the employee.2 11 Since the application of strict construction does not
change this analysis under the Act, Robinson's complete overruling of State
ex rel. Badami v. Gaertner was excessive. Instead, Robinson should be nar-
rowly read to affirm the principle that co-employees are not immune under
workers' compensation statutes for breaching a personal duty of care owed to
another.
B. Robinson's Temporal and Jurisdictional Scope
Many Missouri litigants are and will continue to be in the following un-
fortunate position: (1) the circumstances giving rise to their lawsuit occurred
after the legislature's change to strict construction in 2005; (2) the litigation
for their case occurred during or after the substantive legal change expounded
by Robinson v. Hooker; and (3) the action which gave rise to their lawsuit
arose before any legislative fix that could remedy the Robinson decision.212
The general rule concerning a judicial decision is that it has retroactive
effect, thus applying to both future events as well as to past occurrences.213
In addition, the general rule concerning statutes is that they are to be applied
prospectively.214 Viewing these two rules in conjunction creates a very dire
state of affairs for employees in Missouri. If the court's decision in Robinson
is applied retroactively in accordance with the general rule, every worker
injured by a co-employee's negligence since the adoption of the 2005
amendments to the Act may sue that co-employee at common law, regardless
of the nature of the breach.215 Further, even if the Missouri legislature enacts
a bill that expressly provides for co-employee immunity, such an enactment
will be prospective. Therefore, the legislative fix would provide immunity
only for those co-employees whose negligent act caused an injury after the
amendment became effective. The combination of judicial retroactivity and
legislative prospectivity traps co-employees in the following liability limbo:
co-employees who negligently performed their employer's duty to provide a
safe work environment and injured a fellow employee will be amenable to
211. See Bender v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 276 S.W. 405, 406 (Mo. 1925).
212. See supra Part IV.
213. Sumners v. Sumners, 701 S.W.2d 720, 722 (Mo. 1985) (en banc) (the semi-
nal case on the matter).
214. See Stark v. Mo. State Treasurer, 954 S.W.2d 645, 647 (Mo. App. W.D.
1997). An exception exists to prospective-only application where the statute express-
ly provides for retrospective application. Id. The proposed bills in the Senate and
House do not contain any express provisions, so it is likely that any legislative action
would be prospective. See supra Part IV.
215. That is not to say that an injured employee is still not subject to Missouri's
five-year statute of limitations. Mo. REV. STAT. § 516.120 (2000).
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216
civil action if the injury occurred after August 28, 2005, and before the
legislative fix. This creates a situation where some co-employee defendants
will be arbitrarily liable just by virtue of unfortunate timing.
The scope of the Robinson decision must be qualified somewhat by not-
ing that, at this point in time, it is only binding precedent for cases filed in the
Western District of Missouri; just because the Supreme Court of Missouri
denied transfer, "[t]hat denial does not necessarily denote approval of the
decision."217 This may in fact be more of an academic distinction than a
practical one because the other Courts of Appeals may find the Western Dis-
trict's holding persuasive and convincing. And more certainly, plaintiffs'
attorneys, seeing that at least one court is sympathetic to the argument, will
file claims based on the Robinson holding even in cases filed in other dis-
218tricts.21
As discussed, a judicial decision has retroactive effect, so the Supreme
Court of Missouri could always remedy the current situation by expressly
overruling the rationale employed in Robinson v. Hooker. However, there
exists some uncertainty as to whether the Supreme Court of Missouri would
rule on such a case. Directly following the Robinson decision, commentators
almost universally accepted that the Supreme Court of Missouri would surely
grant transfer and either affirm the Western District's ruling or expressly re-
ject the court's rationale and reinstate co-employee immunity to its appropri-
ate level. 219 Surprisingly, the court denied transfer, and Robinson became
216. August 28, 2005 was the effective date of the 2005 workers' compensation
amendments. CARL MUELLER, REVIEW OF THE NEW WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW
3 n.2 (2005), available at http://www.kcmba.org/PDF%20Files/WorkersCompLaw
Review.pdf.
217. Tatum v. St. Louis Metro Delivery, Inc., 887 S.W.2d 679, 683 (Mo. App.
E.D. 1994) (illustrating a similar circumstance in which the Western District inter-
preted a term in the workers' compensation statute, and the interpretation was ex-
pressly declined by the Eastern District Court of Appeals). That being said, there is a
school of thought that while the Missouri appellate court system contains three sepa-
rate courts, the Courts of Appeals are all technically one court. Ryan Westhoff, Mis-
souri's One and Only Court of Appeals, 64 J. Mo. B. 294, 294 (2008). Thus, the
decision of one court is supposed to binding on the other. Id. at 295, 298 (but also
noting that "there are several opinions from the Court of Appeals that flatly reject
precedent arising out of other districts when the facts are not significantly distinguish-
able").
218. See, e.g., Brief of Plaintiff/Appellant Camille Gerstner, by and through Her
Next Friend, Kirsten Luster at 23, Gerstner v. Matheny, 347 S.W.3d 550 (Mo. App.
E.D. 2011) (No. ED95881), 2011 WL 1161448, at *23 (trying to utilize the Robinson
decision in the Eastern District Court of Appeals to show that "[a]fter Robinson v.
Hooker, there is no immunity for a co-employees [sic] breach of duty").
219. See, e.g., Kyle Roehler, Be Careful what You Ask for: Missouri Employees
Are No Longer Protected from Co-Employee Tort Liability Because of Tort Reform's
Amendments to the Workers' Compensation Act, COVERED EVENTS (DRI, Chicago,




Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2012
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
binding.220 While it is difficult to opine on the exact reason for the court's
decision to deny transfer, it is reasonable to assume the court found the facts
surrounding Robinson to be an inappropriate vehicle to make a ruling on the
law. The negligent act in Robinson involved a breach of a personal duty.22I
The Supreme Court of Missouri may wait to accept a case that actually pro-
vides for a civil claim to be brought against a co-employee for a failure to
provide a safe workplace.
Considering the nature of the legislative response, absent involvement
by the Supreme Court of Missouri, a vast number of Missouri workers will
remain subject to the current anomalous approach to co-employee liability
despite the legislature's patchwork.
C. The Unintended Consequences ofStrict Interpretation
In 2005, the legislature amended Missouri's workers' compensation
statute to eliminate the requirement of liberal construction and mandated that
any courts shall construe the provisions of the Act strictly.222 The amend-
ment was meant to limit the prior application of the Act in which courts
broadly interpreted the Act to extend benefits to the largest possible class and
resolved any doubts as to the right of compensation in favor of the employ-
ee.223 Without even attempting to take a stance as to the political correctness
of the legislature's switch to the strict interpretation of the workers' compen-
sation statute,224 a significant question still exists as to its practical effective-
ness. Assuming the ends are justified, have the means actually been success-
ful?
Upon first glance, the legislative goal of creating a favorable business
environment seems to have taken place. In 2011, based on the forecast that
the cost of workers' compensation claims in Missouri would decrease by
show I.cfm?contentid=2576&id=414 (stating that "[o]ne would expect the Missouri
Supreme Court to have substantial interest in this issue and accept transfer of the
Robinson case"); see also David T. Ahlheim, Court ofAppeals Eliminates Protection
for Co-Employees in Civil Suits from Workplace Accidents, CAC ADVISOR MO. AND
ILL. UPDATES (Childress Ahlheim Cary LLC, St. Louis, Mo.), Aug. 2010, at 5 (Robin-
son "is a dramatic opinion and is clearly going to be heard by the Supreme Court.
Indeed, the Western District's opinion would contradict even the most recent Su-
preme Court decisions on the issue."); Tomlinson, supra note 134, at 1. ("Hopefully,
the Missouri Supreme Court will realize what a Pandora's box the Robinson verdict
has opened and will reverse the appellate court's ill-conceived decision.").
220. 323 S.W.3d 418, 418 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010), transfer denied, No. SC91216,
2010 Mo. LEXIS 291 (2010) (Mo. Nov. 16, 2010).
221. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
224. For authority critical of the amendments, see Mo. Alliance for Retired Ams.
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eleven percent, insurance regulators recommended that insurance providers
lower employer's rates accordingly.225 Also, consider that the amendments
requiring strict construction occurred in 2005, and that 2011 was the fifth
year in a row that experienced a decrease in recommended workers' compen-
sation rates.226 Based on these figures, it was projected that for 2011, Mis-
souri employers avoided paying as much as eighty million dollars in workers'
compensation premiums. 227
However, given how favorable the current workers' compensation envi-
ronment is to employers, there may be some backlash, which Robinson v.
Hooker arguably represents. Some commentators have suggested that the
Robinson decision was the product of a judicial pushback in response to the
heavy-handed legislative reform to create a more favorable business envi-
ronment by limiting workers' compensation costs. 228 The fact that the Robin-
son court did not need to base its decision on a definitional dichotomy be-
tween employer and employee and could have much more easily followed
established case law tends to support this contention. And while Robinson v.
Hooker has garnered the most attention, it is not the only case to use strict
construction under workers' compensation to allow an employee to bring a
civil action for workplace injuries.
For example, in Franklin v. Certain-Teed Corp., a group of injured em-
ployees filed a class action lawsuit over workplace asbestos exposure.229 The
defendant employers moved to dismiss the case, arguing that asbestos expo-
sure is an "occupational disease" under the Act, and, therefore, workers'
compensation is the exclusive remedy.230 The plaintiffs countered by assert-
ing that after the 2005 amendments calling for strict construction, occupa-
tional diseases are no longer under the province of the workers' compensation
225. David Kerr, Falling Workers' Comp Rates Bode Well for Missouri,
COLUMBIA DAILY TRIB., Feb. 6, 2011, at D3, available at http://www.columbiatrib
une.com/news/2011/feb/06/falling-workers-comp-rates-bode-well-for-missouri/.
226. Id.
227. Missouri Recommends 11% Drop in Workers' Comp Insurance Rates, INS. J.,
Dec. 16, 2010, available at http://www.insurancejoumal.com/news/midwest/2010/12/
16/1 15742.htm.
228. Tomlinson, supra note 134, at 1 ("The seemingly unnecessary judicial activ-
ism expressed in the Robinson decision is likely explained by the growing war over
workers' comp between the judiciary and the General Assembly.").
229. See Missouri Workers' Compensation Law Update, SIMON & HUDSON, P.C.
(Apr. 15, 2010, 4:33 AM), http://nwcdn.com/wordpress/?p=603. The defendants
initially filed a summary judgment motion which was denied without explanation.
Unintended Results of the New Missouri Workers Compensation Act, INJURED
WORKERS' RESOURCE BLOG (Feb. 18, 2010), http://workinjurylawblog.com/
2010/02/18/unintended-results-of-new-work-comp-act/#. The defendants then ap-
pealed that denial to the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District, which
allowed the ruling to stand. Id. The trial judge then denied the motion to dismiss and
ruled on the jurisdictional issue. See id.
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system.231 The term "accident" as used in the Act means "an unexpected
traumatic event or unusual strain identifiable by time and place of occurrence
and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury caused by a spe-
cific event during a single work shift."232 Accordingly, the trial court judge
noted that occupational diseases, which by nature occur over a period of time,
do not seem to be covered under workers' compensation, and, thus, a civil
tort claim is available. 233
Similarly, in State ex rel. KCP & L Greater Missouri Operations Co. v.
Cook, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District - the same
court that decided Robinson v. Hooker - was also presented with the question
of whether an employee's asbestos exposure claim fell within the exclusive-
remedy provision of Missouri's workers' compensation law.23 4 In Cook, just
as the trial court noted in Franklin, the court held that repeat exposure claims
do not fall under the definition of "accident" as provided under the Act, and,
therefore, section 287.120's exclusivity provisions do not apply to occupa-
tional disease claims.235 In so holding, the court expressly acknowledged that
its conclusion may be in conflict with the Missouri legislature's intent in
236
amending the Act to provide for strict construction. However, the court
stated that "[w]hatever our belief as to the 2005 legislature's 'true' intent, this
Court 'cannot rewrite the statute' to effectuate that intent."237
Although the legislature intended to restrict workers' benefits under the
Act - an intention that even the courts recognize - strict construction has led
to the unintended result of allowing civil claims for occupational diseases.
Thus, employers are subject to workers' compensation damages, irrespective
of fault, for workplace injuries covered under the Act and are still confronted
with the possibility of paying out the full measure of common-law damages
for workplace injuries that strict construction deems to be outside the Act.
Not so surprisingly, during the last legislative session, the Missouri leg-
islature also included a provision in its proposed amendments to the Act
which would have once again made workers' compensation the exclusive
remedy for occupational diseases.238 The reactive legislative amendments
23 1. Id.
232. Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.020 (2000).
233. See Unintended Results of the New Missouri Workers Compensation Act,
supra note 229.
234. 353 S.W.3d 14, 16 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011).
235. Id. at 14, 30.
236. Id at 26-27.
237. Id. at 27.
238. S.B. 8, 96th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2011). The bill provided, in
relevant part:
Every employer subject to the provisions of this chapter shall be liable, ir-
respective of negligence, to furnish compensation under the provisions of
this chapter for personal injury or death of the employee by accident or by
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may be the appropriate innediate response to the courts' use of strict con-
struction to reduce the Act's exclusivity provision. However, the willingness
of other Missouri courts to use strict construction to reduce the Act's exclu-
sive remedy provision indicates that Robinson is not just an isolated incident
and is truly indicative of a judicial backlash. Thus, the legislature may have
to revisit the issue of strict construction and not just treat the symptom but
also cure the cause.
VI. CONCLUSION
The court in Robinson v. Hooker interpreted Missouri's workers' com-
pensation statute in a manner that provides absolutely no co-employee im-
munity under its provisions. By doing so, the court diverged from every ac-
cepted approach to co-employee immunity in not only Missouri but also the
rest of the nation. The holding forces employers to bear all of the cost of
workers' compensation with potentially none of the protection. Thus, the
very foundation of workers' compensation has been uprooted.
To complicate matters, any legislative response is likely only to apply
prospectively. Few would disagree with the fact that Robinson's holding is
doctrinally and practically problematic. But ultimately a large amount of co-
employees will still be personally liable for actions that have never previously
given rise to liability. Hopefully the Supreme Court of Missouri will hear a
case calling into question the Robinson holding, find convincing arguments
akin to those presented in this Note, and expressly overrule the decision.
In the broader context, given the fact that the fallout from Robinson is
still in its infancy, it is impossible to quantify the costs its decision will im-
pose on the workers' compensation system. If the floodgates have truly
opened, expensive legal costs, potentially high common law damage awards,
and overall uncertainty are sure to follow. This is ironic considering that over
eighty years ago, workers' compensation was enacted to remedy some of
these very same concerns. Ultimately, the unintended consequences of strict
interpretation may swallow the intended effect.
Id.
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